Implications of Abhisit’s ‘Road Map’

Abhisit has no intention at all of honouring the dissolution/election timetable; his backers (…) have no intention whatever of relinquishing their hold on power so we must all spend our time thinking not about elections, but tactics, because the ‘road-map’ is a tactic not a strategy for Abhisit. Turkeys do not vote for an early Xmas.

The way it will go is this:

Abhisit will declare a dissolution date – he will do so in such a way as to suggest a reluctance, which in its turn will suggest a commitment under dures, but a commitment none-the-less. Smoke and mirrors.

In the intervening time Abhisit and his backers (…) will do three things:

1. They will search for a number of reasons not to dissolve the Parliament, the list of reasons he could use has already been provided in the form of his list of 5 preconditions to a dissolution, so this is where it will come from. All of these 5 preconditions are so deliberately vague and woolly that they could, and will, mean whatever he wishes them to mean come the day.

2. They will reinforce his position in several major respects, not least among which is getting the new Army chief in post, he will be decidedly more hawkish than Anupong, and is guaranteed to do the bidding of Abhisit and the Palace in declaring war on the Thai people.

3. They will pick off the leaders of the UDD one by one by stealth such that when he refuses to dissolve the Parliament, the UDD will be in no position to rally effectively again. The foundations for this process have already been laid.

I don’t see any alternative to believing this is the real intent of Abhisit and (…), to think otherwise is to simply be gullible.

The stakes have been pumped up far too high. Abhisit making this into a plot to overthrow the Monarchy will only have planted in the Thai mind that the Monarchy is not (…) as the propaganda machine would have it, and is actually vulnerable. Further, that many Thais are prepared to contemplate a Thai state (…). This was a very serious blunder but the genie is out of the bottle now.

The bunker mentality of Abhisit and (…) on its own will guarantee that this is very far from being over, and the mendacity, double-speak and deception that Abhisit has practiced in domestic and foreign interactions since he rose to power through the chicanery of (…) and the paid defection of Newin the betrayer guarantee that he should certainly not be trusted in this ‘road-map’ illusion.

Note: Apologies for so many edits but I needed to remove the bits that could spell trouble for me as the blog’s owner.

Tumbler: “This time the reds again appear not entirely satisfied with Abhisit’s offer to hold elections in November, which makes one wonder whether an early dissolution is what they really want.”

I don’t think the Reds’ rejection of Abhisit’s offer to dissolve parliament in November should be read as the Reds changing their goal (or them not really having dissolution as their goal in the first place).

I think time frame is crucial to both the Reds and the government. A dissolution and fresh elections anytime before October would mean that Pua Thai Party would likely be in power in October and would be overseeing the annual appointments of military and police top brass in October, in which they would likely block General Prayut (a hardline royalist and anti-UDD) accession to Army General. For the same reason, it is crucial for the government to hang on to power at least until October, when they would likely push Gen Prayut to power.

As long as the army’s role is a major factor that decides the survival of a government (and possibly of some other institutions), and as long as the army chief has control over the army’s role, the appointment of army chief is a central concern for both parties.