Thailand’s Continued Unrest: Implications on the Region

Simon Tisdall in The Guardian tries to make the case why the international community should pay more attention to the violence in Thailand:

If the clashes in Bangkok were transposed to central Paris, international commentators would be talking excitedly about revolution, class warfare, the future of the social contract, looming economic catastrophe and the end of democracy. Outside pressure to calm the situation would be immense.

Indeed there have been complaints by frustrated Thais as to why the Bangkok crisis has not got more international attention. But if the conflict drags on, that may well change.

[...]

Thailand’s continuing democratic example matters to Malaysia, to the south, where tensions over ethnic, civil and human rights sometimes produce autocratic responses, and even more so in Burma, to the north, where pro-democracy forces oppose a brutal military dictatorship. But sustaining Thai democracy also matters to Britain and other western countries, which look at a region increasingly influenced by the Chinese communist hegemony and wonder how long key states such as Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim country, will uphold western democratic values and standards if neighbours discard them.

Generally speaking, Thailand used to be regarded as the region’s “beacon of democracy” especially in the 1990s and early 2000s. The coup in 2006 did much to destroy that image, and currently Indonesia – with its increasingly robust democratic politics – seems to be the Western world’s new darling in terms of setting an example for other Southeast Asian countries to follow.

Yet, it is still premature to think of the reds as a definitively pro-democracy movement for the reasons I have pointed out before (see here and here). And in the next section, Tisdall is cautious enough not to overplay the reds’ and Thaksin’s democratic credentials (although calling the red-shirts “a pro-Thaksin movement” is inaccurate as well):

The political, as well as physical, collision between the redshirts – a pro-Thaksin movement ostensibly representing the urban and rural poor – and establishment forces comprising the political and military elites, royalists and Thailand’s newly wealthy bourgeoisie also has a significance reaching beyond Bangkok. The rich versus poor theme can be overplayed. The reality is more complicated.

The billionaire Thaksin is no Robin Hood, and his time in power was marked by a violent war on drugs, high-level corruption and harsh military measures in the south. [...]

Tisdall goes on to give us his last reason why the world should be worried:

Southern Thailand is home to a long-running separatist insurgency involving ethnic Malay Muslims who reject direct rule from Bangkok. There is evidence that al-Qaida-related activists in Indonesia and Malaysia have tried to fan and exploit this conflict in the past.

A collapse, or prolonged paralysis, of the central civil authority would be an invitation to further polarising unrest. And the last thing world needs is another battlefront with militant Islam.

In other words, a state failure.

Related posts (automatically generated):

1. Petition to Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats, Regarding the Violence in Thailand
2. Thailand Chosen to Head UN Human Rights Council
3. The Economist: Collapse of Talks Was ‘Tragic’
4. The UN Speaks
5. “When Abhisit Looks in the Mirror, He Will See Thaksin.”